The “Save” is a bad stat with good intentions. It was an attempt to quantify the contributions made by relief pitchers in a way easily grasped by fans and sportswriters. Since most sportswriters are pretty dense, one can really appreciate the sentiment.
Unfortunately, as the save stat evolved, so too did the role of the reliever. In Joe Garagiola’s book “Baseball is a Funny Game” we learn that baseball managers relied on their best bullpen reliever, known as the “short man” to pitch the team out of tight spots when the game’s outcome was in doubt. It didn’t matter when this was, it could be in the ninth inning or the sixth. These relievers eventually picked up the nickname “fireman” because they put out fires.
There is no stat for “fires put out by.” Today, there are leverage indexes and win-percentage stats which give us some indication of the value of a pitcher’s performance based on the specific circumstances of the game. Learning these advanced sabermetrics can be daunting endeavour for the uninitiated.
It’s just easier to count up saves.
So, eventually, managers started to manage not around the circumstances of the game but by the circumstances of save stat. As a consequence, often a team’s best pitcher is not used when the game is in doubt.
Depending on what analysis you use, there is about a 3% difference between using an exceptional pitcher in a save situation and using a mediocre pitcher. The three out, three run save is easy to get.
But what about the four run, one out save? Nathan already has two this year and is likely to get more. On June 28th against the Cardinals, and on July 1st against the Royals Nathan was able to put two easy saves up on the board with little effort.
The reason is because in both games knuckleballer R.A. Dickey was given the task to pitch the last frame. Even good knuckleballers have high WHIPs (Walks and Hits per Inning Pitched). They allow a lot of baserunners. Good knuckleballers deal with these ups and downs and Dickey has shown incredible growth this year in handling difficult situations throwing his exceptionally fast butterflies.
In both games Dickey worked through trouble and got two outs. But, once the tying run is on-deck, it’s a save situation. Dickey goes out, Nathan goes in, game over. And the stupidity continues
Maybe these saves will provide Nathan the attention he deserves. Based on sabermetric stats like xFIP and PRC, Nathan ranks among the top three closers in baseball this year. He deserves a spot on the All Star team and getting five or six cheap saves might get him the attention of the national media.
But it’s still really stupid.
Filed under: Baseball, Bibliography, Columns, Sabermetrics, Sports, Twins
The other stat, that may not be as stupid, but is as simple and is having a profound effect upon the game – is pitch count. Why 100? Just a nice round number? Clearly back in the 70 and early 80’s with four man rotations, the pitch count didn’t matter as much. Some pitchers clearly thrived in that era. But today…
Well, there’s plenty of evidence to support a count. The lousy records of post-season pitchers on 3 days rest, the implosion of the Cubs pitching staff in 2004 after being rode hard and wet in 2003, the seemingly healthy Twins pitchers who live and die by the 100 pitch count.
100 pitches… very easy to manage to that number. But I believe there is a competitve advantage that stats, medical science, and conditioning could bring about.
Let’s just say you have Johan and Josh Becket on your team. If you could determine that Johan’s arm is fine every 4th day for 150 pitches (akin to Tom Seaver or Nolan Ryan in the day), don’t you ride him? And conversely, if Beckett is only good for 90 pitches every 6th day before injury risk sky-rockets…
The combination of stats, medical science, and probably psychology are way too much for a guy like Gardenhire to handle, but if it could be done, this represents a massive competitive advantage.